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# Defense Issues

## Newsletter

October 2006

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### GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS ..... 7

IRAQ'S INSURGENCY MUST BE OVERCOME BY MORE THAN MILITARY POWER (Commander says Baghdad hotspots are being swept and held for rebuilding efforts)

By Jacquelyn S. Porth, Washington File Security Affairs Writer. September 22, 2006 ..... 7

RICE DISMISSES IRAN'S CONDITIONS ON NUCLEAR TALKS (The terms are clear, U.S. secretary of state tells reporters)

By Judy Aita, Washington File United Nations Correspondent. September 21, 2006 ..... 7

IRAQI FREEDOM VITAL TO DEFEATING TERRORISM, RICE DECLARES (Cheney, Rice cite progress in War on Terror in television interviews)

By Howard Cincotta, Washington File Special Correspondent. September 10, 2006 ..... 8

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT, AUGUST 24: LEBANON UPDATE, AUGUST 24, 2006 (U.S. military shifts responsibility for Lebanon to European Command)..... 8

### CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.) ..... 9

LEBANON

Alfred B. Prados, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

CRS Report for Congress, Updated August 15, 2006 ..... 9

### THE WHITE HOUSE ..... 9

PRESIDENT BUSH NAMES DELEGATION FOR LEBANON RECONSTRUCTION (Business leaders will launch reconstruction fund, campaign for donations) September 23, 2006 ..... 9

WAR ON TERROR THE "DECISIVE" 21ST CENTURY STRUGGLE, BUSH SAYS (President says United States will not leave Iraq "until victory is achieved") 2006-08-31..... 10

## **NATO..... 11**

NATO MINISTERS DISCUSS IMPORTANCE OF AFGHAN MISSION, (Secretary Rice Touts Nato As Great Source Of Security)  
By Judy Aita, Washington File Staff Writer. September 21, 2006 ..... 11

NATO SUPREME COMMANDER PRAISES PROGRESS OF AFGHAN ARMY (Effective Counternarcotics Effort Still Needed, General Jones Tells Senators) September 21, 2006 ..... 12

OPERATION MEDUSA FOILED TALIBAN PLANS, NATO COMMANDER SAYS (Offensive Reduced Taliban Strength By At Least One-Fourth, Says General Jones) 20 September 2006 ..... 12

COMBAT, REBUILDING BOTH CRUCIAL IN AFGHANISTAN, NATO'S JONES SAYS (NATO's supreme allied commander briefs on current missions)  
By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer, 17 August 2006 ..... 13

KOSOVO STATUS TALKS AT CRUCIAL STAGE, CONTACT GROUP SAYS (Officials reaffirm support for negotiated settlement in 2006)  
By Jeffrey Thomas, Washington File Staff Writer. 21 September 2006..... 13

RICE MEETS TADIC, SAYS SERBIA CAN BE "FORCE FOR STABILITY" (U.S., Serbia sign status-of-forces agreement; Kosovo talks resume in Austria)  
By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer. 07 September 2006..... 14

NATO FOCUSED ON AFGHANISTAN, EXPORTING TRAINING, U.S. ENVOY SAYS (Ambassador Nuland also discusses Kosovo, possible Middle East training center)  
By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer (25 July 2006) ..... 14

## **THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS ..... 15**

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE ..... 15

MORE TROOPS: THE CONSENSUS FOR A LARGER ARMY IS ABOUT AS COMPLETE AS IT COULD BE  
By Frederick W. Kagan, William Kristol. Posted: Monday, September 25, 2006  
Published in *The Weekly Standard*, Publication Date: October 2, 2006 ..... 15

IRAN'S NUCLEAR IMPASSE

By Michael A. Ledeen

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs)  
July 20, 2006..... 16

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ..... 16

A BROOKINGS SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY STATESMAN'S FORUM ON "IRAQ IN TRANSITION"  
Featured Speaker: Barham Salih, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. September 13, 2006..... 16

WHAT PRICE FREEDOM? ASSESSING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S FREEDOM AGENDA

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Research Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy; Sarah E. Yerkes, Ph.D.

Candidate, Georgetown University, Saban Center Analysis, Number 10, September 2006 ..... 17

BRIDGING THE TRANSATLANTIC COUNTERTERRORISM GAP Jeremy Shapiro, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe; Daniel L. Byman, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy Published in <i>The Washington Quarterly</i> , Autumn 2006 .....	17
THE 9-11 WAR PLUS 5: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD AT U.S.-ISLAMIC WORLD RELATIONS Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Brookings Institution, U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper #10, September 2006 .....	18
GLOBAL NATO Ivo H. Daalder and James Goldgeier, Brookings Institution This article appears in the September/October 2006 publication of <i>Foreign Affairs</i> .....	18
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE .....	19
HIZBOLLAH'S OUTLOOK IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT By Amal Saad-Ghorayeb CEIP <i>Policy Outlook</i> No. 27, August 2006.....	19
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS).....	20
JUDGING THE IRANIAN THREAT: 20 QUESTIONS WE NEED TO ANSWER CSIS Report, September 19, 2006 .....	20
NATO RELUCTANCE TO SEND MORE TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE NO SURPRISE By Julianne Smith, Deputy Director CSIS International Security Program, September 20, 2006 .....	21
FIVE YEARS AFTER 9/11 Edited by Julianne Smith and Thomas Sanderson CSIS, ISBN 0-89206-492-7, September 7, 2006 .....	21
WINNING THE WAR ON TERRORISM: The Need for a Fundamentally Different Strategy Anthony H. Cordesman CSIS, September 25, 2006 .....	22
MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ Anthony H. Cordesman CSIS Report, September 5, 2006 .....	22
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS .....	23
AMERICAN MUSLIMS AND THE THREAT OF HOMEGROWN TERRORISM Eben Kaplan, Assistant Editor Council on Foreign Relations, September 22, 2006.....	23
PRIORITIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Steven Simon, CFR, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Sept 12, 2006 .....	23
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY: GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT Alan P. Larson, David M. Marchick. Council Special Report No. 18 Council on Foreign Relations Press, July 2006.....	24

HERITAGE FOUNDATION .....	24
CONGRESS JEOPARDIZES ITS OWN POWERS BY BALKING ON TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM COMPROMISE by Todd Gaziano and Garrett Murch Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1218, September 18, 2006 .....	24
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG).....	25
MOLDOVA'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE Europe Report N°175 ICG, 17 August 2006 .....	25
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU) .....	25
REFORMING PENTAGON STRATEGIC DECISIONMAKING By Christopher J. Lamb and Irving Lachow <i>Strategic Forum</i> No. 221, July 2006 National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies .....	25
PEW .....	26
AMERICAN ATTITUDES HOLD STEADY IN FACE OF FOREIGN CRISES: STRONG SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL - NO SURGE IN TERROR CONCERNS OR BOOST FOR BUSH Pew Report, Released: August 17, 2006 .....	26
RAND .....	26
RADICALIZATION: HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATION John D. Woodward, Jr., RAND Institute Testimony presented to the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment on Sept 20, 2006.....	25
AIR POWER IN THE NEW COUNTERINSURGENCY ERA: THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF USAF ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE MISSIONS Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, Karl P. Mueller RAND Monograph, September 15, 2006.....	27
NEW COMBAT AND NONCOMBAT ROLES FOR U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS John Gordon, IV, Peter A. Wilson, John Birkler, Steven Boraz, Gordon T. Lee RAND Research Brief, September 8, 2006.....	27
EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT REQUIRES SOPHISTICATED INTELLIGENCE, RAPID RESPONSE, AND LONG-RANGE CAPABILITIES David A. Shlapak RAND Research Brief, September 7, 2006.....	28
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE .....	28
STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM Edited by Dr. Williamson Murray SSI, September 2006.....	27
THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS Edited by Colonel (USA, Ret) Joseph R. Cerami, Lieutenant General (USA, Ret) Richard A. Chilcoat, Patrick B Baetjer SSI Colloquium Report, 122 p., August 2006.....	29

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE.....	29
UNDERSTANDING THE IRAN-HEZBOLLAH CONNECTION	
By Robert Grace and Andrew Mandelbaum	
USIPeace Briefing, September 2006.....	29

THE RISE OF ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN BANGLADESH	
Sumit Ganguly	
USIP Special Report No. 171, August 2006 .....	29

## ARTICLES FROM U.S. JOURNALS ..... 30

HIGH-TECH TERRORISM: AL-QAEDA'S USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY	
Brachman, Jarret M.	
<i>Fletcher Forum of World Affairs</i> , vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 149-164 (AA06329).....	30

SENSE AND SYMBOLISM: EUROPE TAKES ON HUMAN SECURITY	
Liotta, P. H.; Owen, Taylor	
<i>Parameters</i> , Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 85-102 (AA06330).....	30

AGENCIES SEEK SEAMLESS NETWORK	
Magnuson, Stew	
<i>National Defense</i> , vol. 90, no. 626, January 2006, pp. 42-43 (AA06331) .....	31

NATIONALISM AND POLICYMAKING IN THE BALKANS	
Miller, Nicholas J.	
<i>Georgetown Journal of International Affairs</i> , Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2006, pp. 15-19 (AA06332).....	31

A DANGEROUS SEPARATION: THE SCHISM BETWEEN AMERICAN SOCIETY AND ITS MILITARY	
Wrona, Richard M.	
<i>World Affairs</i> , vol. 169, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 25-38 (AA06333) .....	32

FROM CAPTIVE TO FAILED STATE: ARGENTINA UNDER SYSTEMIC POPULISM, 1975-2006	
Escude, Carlos	
<i>Fletcher Forum of World Affairs</i> , vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 125-148 (AA06349).....	32

LESSONS OF THE KOREAN WAR FOR THE "SIX-PARTY TALKS"	
Holmes, James R.	
<i>World Affairs</i> , vol. 169, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp.3-24 (AA06350).....	32

AL QAEDA'S PANDEMIC	
Kitfield, James	
<i>National Journal</i> , Vol. 38, No. 35, September 2, 2006, pp. 20-27 (AA06351) .....	33

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE: ENABLER OF INSURGENT SUCCESS	
Record, Jeffrey	
<i>Parameters</i> , Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 36-49 (AA06352).....	33

DECLARING VICTORY	
Fallows, James	
<i>Atlantic Monthly</i> , September 2006 (AA06312) .....	34

COMMON VALUES: A NEW AGENDA FOR U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS	
Green, Michael; Szechenyi, Nicholas	
<i>Georgetown Journal of International Affairs</i> , Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2006, pp. 47-55 (AA06313).....	34

THE CAUSE OF STRIFE IN THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

Kang, David C.

*Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 23-31 (AA06314)..... 34

FIGHTING FOR STATEHOOD: THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN-BASED RESISTANCE IN THE EAST  
TIMORESE, PALESTINIAN, AND KOSOVO ALBANIAN SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS

Stephan, Maria

*Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 57-79 (AA06315)..... 35

REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN KYRGYZSTAN

Wood, Tom

*Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 30 no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 43-56 (AA06316)..... 35

THE "SOFT WAR" FOR EUROPE'S EAST

Jackson, Bruce P.

*Policy Review*, no. 137, June/July 2006, pp. 3-14 (AA06292)..... 35

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY REFRAMED: THE IMPACT OF MODERNITY

Gat, Azar

*World Politics*, vol. 58, no. 1, October 2005, pp. 73-100 (AA06291) ..... 36

THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION: A MODEL OF ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY

Aslan, Reza

*New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 24-25 (AA06290) ..... 36

EXERCISING WARTIME POWERS: THE NEED FOR A STRONG EXECUTIVE

Yoo, John

*Harvard International Review*, vol. 28, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 14-17 (AA06274) ..... 36

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND U.S. GRAND STRATEGY

Nye, Joseph S.

*Foreign Affairs* vol. 85, no. 4, July/August 2006, pp. 123-148 (AA06273) ..... 37

TO A BAGHDAD VICTORY VIA SAIGON: HOW THE WRONG NATION-BUILDING STRATEGY THAT  
FAILED IN VIETNAM CAN BE RIGHTED TO SUCCEED IN IRAQ

Lomperis, Timothy J.

*World Affairs*, vol. 168, no. 4, Spring 2006, pp. 147-156 (AA06272)..... 37

REGIME CYCLES: DEMOCRACY, AUTOCRACY, AND REVOLUTION IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA

Hale, Henry

*World Politics*, vol. 58 no. 1, October 2005, pp. 73-100 (AA06270) ..... 37

AMERICA'S NEW STRATEGIC PARTNER?

Carter, Ashton B.

*Foreign Affairs* vol. 85, no. 4, July/August 2006, pp. 33-44 (AA06268) ..... 38

ELECTRONIC JOURNAL:

REBUILDING AND RESILIENCE: Five Years After 9/11

U.S. Department of State, August 2006..... 38

ELECTRONIC JOURNAL:

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

U.S. Department of State, September 2006.....38

## GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

### **IRAQ'S INSURGENCY MUST BE OVERCOME BY MORE THAN MILITARY POWER (Commander says Baghdad hotspots are being swept and held for rebuilding efforts)**

**By Jacquelyn S. Porth, Washington File Security Affairs Writer**

**September 22, 2006**

Washington – The commander of multinational forces in Baghdad, Iraq, says the insurgency and sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital city cannot be quelled solely by military means.

Army Major General James Thurman told Pentagon reporters via videoconference September 22 that political and economic factors are also critical to the effort to restore security in Baghdad.

With the Iraqi Council of Representatives back in session, he said, “we’re optimistic that the government will move forward to deal with the militias and provide the unified support that the Iraqi forces require, and [that] set those conditions for economic improvement.”

Enemies of democracy in Iraq are determined to disrupt the government, Thurman said, yet Iraqi government officials continue to strive to meet security needs and work through what he called the “tough issues.” He said the new Iraqi defense minister is committed to and is working hard to meet current security requirements and the coalition forces are assisting him in that endeavor.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6092207.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6092207.htm)

A transcript of Thurman’s briefing is available on the Department of Defense Web site:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3729>

### **RICE DISMISSES IRAN'S CONDITIONS ON NUCLEAR TALKS (The terms are clear, U.S. secretary of state tells reporters)**

**By Judy Aita, Washington File United Nations Correspondent**

**September 21, 2006**

[...] Rice said that there could be no new conditions added to those set by six major countries -- China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States -- for negotiations on a package of economic and technological incentives in exchange for Iran's ending its enrichment activities. A July 31 Security Council resolution backed the group's position and gave Iran until August 31 to stop enrichment or face sanctions.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6092212.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6092212.htm)

A transcript of the secretary of state’s remarks is available on the State Department’s Web site:

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/72954.htm>



**IRAQI FREEDOM VITAL TO DEFEATING TERRORISM, RICE DECLARES (Cheney, Rice cite progress in War on Terror in television interviews)  
By Howard Cincotta, Washington File Special Correspondent  
September 10, 2006**

Washington -- Saddam Hussein represented a nexus between terrorism and violence that would have made progress toward a better future for the Middle East and the world difficult to imagine if he had remained in power, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a series of television news interviews on September 10, the eve of the fifth anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

From the perspective of the past five years, Rice said, the United States and its allies have made major progress in the War on Terror. She cited the capture or killing of many central al Qaeda figures such as Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who plotted and executed the September 11 attacks; the liberation of more than 50 million people in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the gains in intelligence-gathering and cooperation with nations around the world.

Along with making the United States itself more secure, Rice said on Fox News Sunday, "I think that the record will show that the last five years have been years of reorganizing our international alliances for this long war and reorienting our strategic policy toward one that simply will not accept the conditions in the Middle East and in other places that have allowed extremism to flourish at the expense of moderation."

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6090803.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6090803.htm)

Transcripts of Secretary Rice's interviews on Fox News Sunday, CBS's Face the Nation and CNN's Late Edition can be found on the State Department Web site:

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/>

The transcript of Vice President Cheney's interview on NBC's Meet the Press is available on the White House Web site: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060910.html>

**DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT, AUGUST 24: LEBANON UPDATE, AUGUST 24, 2006 (U.S. military shifts responsibility for Lebanon to European Command)**

The planned transfer of responsibility of U.S. military operations associated with Lebanon from the U.S. Central Command to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has taken place, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.

As of August 23 EUCOM's Joint Task Force-Lebanon has replaced the CENTCOM's Task Force-59. The Lebanon task force was formed to assist in any humanitarian activities and support requests from U.S. Embassy Beirut and the State Department to aid the Lebanese people as they recover from a month of conflict.

Navy Vice Admiral John "Boomer" Stufflebeem, commander of the 6th Fleet, has been assigned to head up JTF-Lebanon. Stufflebeem said his command will execute whatever humanitarian



assistance is needed by the embassy or the department. His task force has more than 2,400 military personnel as well as ships and aircraft ready to respond.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_08/alia/a6082401.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_08/alia/a6082401.htm)

## CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)

### LEBANON

**Alfred B. Prados, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division**

**CRS Report for Congress, Updated August 15, 2006**



Tensions between Israel and the militant Palestinians in the Gaza territory spread to Lebanon in mid-July 2006 as a cycle of violence began between Israel and militants from the Lebanese Shi'ite Muslim organization Hezbollah. On July 12, possibly in a gesture of solidarity with the radical Palestinian organization Hamas combating Israel in Gaza, Hezbollah units launched attacks across Syria's northern border, killing eight Israelis and seizing two Israeli soldiers as hostages. Israel launched widespread air and artillery strikes on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and Lebanese infrastructure including Beirut International Airport, vowing to continue the attacks until the Israeli hostages are returned. Hezbollah has launched daily attacks on northern Israel with extended-range rockets, penetrating as

far as the northern Israeli port of Haifa, Israel's third largest city, and beyond, to which Israel has responded with air strikes. Military commentators have said Hezbollah has 12,000 or more largely unguided Katyusha rockets, with ranges of 20-45 miles, but also some more advanced variants of Iranian or Syrian manufacture. Though with limited accuracy, they can cover a wide range of Israeli territory.

<http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL33509.pdf>

## THE WHITE HOUSE

### **PRESIDENT BUSH NAMES DELEGATION FOR LEBANON RECONSTRUCTION**

**(Business leaders will launch reconstruction fund, campaign for donations)**

**September 23, 2006**

Washington – President Bush has named a delegation of prominent U.S. business leaders who will travel to Lebanon for meetings with Prime Minister Siniora and Lebanese officials and business representatives to discuss plans for rebuilding and reconstruction, the White House announced September 23.

Upon their return, the four business leaders plan to launch a nationwide campaign in the U.S. for private donations to a fund for Lebanese reconstruction, according to the White House. The fund will complement the \$230 million in aid pledged by the United States government.

“The United States believes it is important that Prime Minister Fuad Siniora and Lebanon’s young democracy succeed,” says a State Department press release.

The fund will be managed by Global Impact, a leading U.S. nonprofit organization.

The business representatives are Craig Barrett, the chairman of Intel Corporation; John Chambers, the president and CEO of Cisco Systems; Yousif Ghafari, the chairman of GHAFARI, Inc.; and Ray Irani, the chairman, CEO and president of Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

The delegation will be headed by Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Dina Habib Powell and accompanied by the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Jeffrey Feltman.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6092203.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6092203.htm)

The text of President Bush's announcement can be found on the White House Web site:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060923-1.html>

### **WAR ON TERROR THE "DECISIVE" 21ST CENTURY STRUGGLE, BUSH SAYS President says United States will not leave Iraq "until victory is achieved" 2006-08-31**

Washington -- President Bush says the War on Terror is “the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century,” pitting free nations against those who employ violence to impose a “dark vision of tyranny” across the world.

In the first of a scheduled series of five speeches leading up to the fifth anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks against New York and Washington, the president told an audience in Salt Lake City August 31, “We will not allow the terrorists to dictate the future of this century, so we will defeat them in Iraq.”

The United States bears a responsibility to the Iraqi people to help them achieve the freedom they desire, and is working with Iraqi leaders who can count on American partnership so long as they promote freedom and democracy, Bush said.

U.S. forces will not leave Iraq “until victory is achieved,” even though the president warned of more difficulties ahead. “This is a pivotal moment for the Middle East. The world is watching, and in Iraq the forces of freedom will prevail,” Bush said.

The United States has a “straightforward choice” in its approach to the Middle East, Bush said. The United States can help lead the region toward a more hopeful future, or it can allow the Middle East to follow the course on which it was headed before September 11, 2001, and leave future generations “a region dominated by terrorist states and radical dictators armed with nuclear weapons.”

The president said that despite sectarian and geographic differences, the terrorist groups now at work constitute a “worldwide network” of radicals who are using terror to kill or intimidate those who stand in the way of their ideology.

Bush described them as a “self-appointed few” who are trying to impose their views on the world and compared them to totalitarian groups like the Nazis that the world confronted in the 20th century. Countries that harbor or support terrorists are enemies of the United States, he reiterated.

Turning to Iran, which faces an August 31 deadline from the U.N. Security Council to stop its uranium enrichment and reprocessing, Bush said the international community has offered that country a better course for the future if it abandons its quest for nuclear weapons.

However, he said, Iran has responded with “further defiance and delay.” The United States will continue to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict, but Bush added that “there must be consequences” for Iran’s behavior.

The transcript of the president’s remarks is available on the White House Web site:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060831-1.html>

as is a fact sheet outlining Bush’s strategy for winning the War on Terror:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060831.html>

## **NATO**

### **NATO MINISTERS DISCUSS IMPORTANCE OF AFGHAN MISSION, (Secretary Rice Touts Nato As Great Source Of Security)**

**By Judy Aita, Washington File Staff Writer**

**September 21, 2006**

New York -- Taking advantage of the opening of the 61st U.N. General Assembly to prepare for their summit later this year, NATO foreign ministers reaffirmed the importance of the mission in Afghanistan and emphasized the need to link security with economic development efforts, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said September 21.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried said that the meeting provided an impetus for the November summit in Riga, Latvia, and “an important opportunity for us to remind ourselves and the world how important NATO is to our common security.” (See related article.)

Secretary of State Condoleezza told the ministers that “in a world where our interests and our ideas are increasingly joined, in a world where our democratic principles are our greatest source of security, NATO remains one of the most important, effective, and remarkable alliances in history,” Fried said.

The ministers had a "good discussion" of NATO's operations in Afghanistan, success in supporting reform and deepening democracy in Eastern Europe and help for African Union (AU) peacekeepers in Darfur, the U.S. assistant secretary said.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6092101.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6092101.htm)

**NATO SUPREME COMMANDER PRAISES PROGRESS OF AFGHAN ARMY (Effective Counternarcotics Effort Still Needed, General Jones Tells Senators)  
September 21, 2006**

Washington — Afghanistan's national army is the brightest spot in country's new democracy, NATO's supreme commander says.

"By far, the Afghan National Army is the most successful pillar of our reconstruction efforts to date," Marine General James Jones told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 21.

Military reform is one of the five pillars of Afghan security sector reform formally established in April 2002 at a donors' conference in Geneva, Switzerland. The United States agreed to be the lead country in promoting military reform; Germany did the same for police reform; Japan agreed to head the task of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating ex-combatants; Italy agreed to be the lead for judicial reform; and the United Kingdom stepped forward on counternarcotics efforts.

"[T]raining the police forces, jump-starting the judicial reform, and developing an effective counternarcotics program are, hand-in-hand, three of the most important things that need to be done in Afghanistan in the near future," Jones said.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6092103.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6092103.htm)

**OPERATION MEDUSA FOILED TALIBAN PLANS, NATO COMMANDER SAYS  
(Offensive Reduced Taliban Strength By At Least One-Fourth, Says General Jones)  
20 September 2006**

Washington -- NATO's supreme commander says the alliance's recently concluded offensive operation in southern Afghanistan killed at least a quarter of the former Taliban regime's fighters, and possibly more.

Meeting with journalists at the Pentagon September 20, Marine General James Jones was asked for an overall estimate of the number of Taliban fighters killed in Operation Medusa, wherein 6,000 NATO troops from five countries, along with Afghan army forces, established a presence for the first time in Khandahar province. (See related article.)

Jones said the number of those killed was around 1,000, "but ... if you said 1,500 it wouldn't surprise me."

The alliance estimates Taliban fighting strength at 3,000 to 4,000 militants, Jones said, plus Afghans that the Taliban pays or coerces to assist it in specific military operations.

Using the higher number for Taliban strength and the lowest number for their losses in fighting NATO, it can be presumed that the Taliban lost at least one-quarter of its fighters in the past few weeks. Using other figures would make the percentage lost even higher, Jones said.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6092002.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6092002.htm)

**COMBAT, REBUILDING BOTH CRUCIAL IN AFGHANISTAN, NATO'S JONES SAYS  
(NATO's supreme allied commander briefs on current missions)**

**By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer, 17 August 2006**

Washington -- NATO troops in Afghanistan face a “test of wills” as they take over security throughout much of the country, says U.S. Marine Corps General James Jones, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe.

Along with fighting a deadly mix of militants and narcotics traffickers, NATO troops also are placing high emphasis on reconstruction missions, Jones said during a Pentagon news conference August 17.

The focus on reconstruction will allow Afghanistan’s people can see tangible results of the five-year-old international presence in their country, Jones said.

He said there are two rules he lives by: “Don't make any more enemies than you've already got, and don't do anything that's not good for the people.”

NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took military control of southern Afghanistan on July 31 and plans to provide security for the entire country by the end of the year. Since July 31, 11 NATO soldiers have died in fighting and another 50 have been wounded, Jones said. In addition, there have been two non-battle deaths and 35 non-battle injuries, he said.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_08/alia/a6081702.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_08/alia/a6081702.htm)

**KOSOVO STATUS TALKS AT CRUCIAL STAGE, CONTACT GROUP SAYS (Officials reaffirm support for negotiated settlement in 2006)**

**By Jeffrey Thomas, Washington File Staff Writer**

**21 September 2006**

Washington -- With talks over Kosovo’s final status at a “crucial stage,” a group of government officials known as the Contact Group met September 20 and reaffirmed its commitment to a negotiated settlement for the province before the end of 2006. The group also warned both Serbia and Kosovo that neither party can block the status process from advancing.

Meeting in New York on the sidelines of the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, the Contact Group officials -- representing France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States -- were joined by the NATO secretary-general and officials from the European Union and the United Nations, including U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice served as chair of the group.

The Contact Group, which has coordinated international action in the Balkans since 1994, reaffirmed its support for Ahtisaari, who has been leading the talks over the future status of Kosovo.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6092107.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6092107.htm)

**RICE MEETS TADIC, SAYS SERBIA CAN BE "FORCE FOR STABILITY" (U.S., Serbia sign status-of-forces agreement; Kosovo talks resume in Austria)**

**By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer  
07 September 2006**

Washington -- Serbia can have a prosperous, democratic future and be a “force for stability,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Serbian President Boris Tadic as they signed a status-of-forces agreement between the two nations September 7 in Washington.

Tadic is visiting the United States to hold private meetings with various U.S. officials about the future status of the Kosovo province, currently administered by the United Nations. The latest round of U.N.-sponsored Kosovo talks began September 7 in Vienna, Austria.

The status-of-forces pact signed by Rice and Tadic clarifies the rights of U.S. military personnel when visiting Serbia. During a news conference, Tadic said Serbia’s military plans to work with the National Guard of the U.S. state of Ohio under a U.S-sponsored partnership program.

Meeting with reporters in Washington, Rice said the United States and Serbia have a shared vision of Serbia’s future that is “one of prosperity and democracy and a force for stability in the Balkans and Europe as a whole.”

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_09/alia/a6090704.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_09/alia/a6090704.htm)

**NATO FOCUSED ON AFGHANISTAN, EXPORTING TRAINING, U.S. ENVOY SAYS (Ambassador Nuland also discusses Kosovo, possible Middle East training center)**

**By Vince Crawley, Washington File Staff Writer (25 July 2006)**

Washington -- Afghanistan is a top priority for NATO and is expected to dominate the alliance’s November summit in Latvia, says Victoria Nuland, U.S. ambassador to NATO, who also discussed Kosovo peace talks and possible new training centers for the Middle East.

“On the military operations side, missions one, two, three through six are Afghanistan,” Nuland said in a recent Washington File interview in Brussels, Belgium. She added that Afghanistan not

only is important strategically, but is also a testing ground for efficient multinational cooperation.

During the interview, which took place in mid-July, Nuland discussed the U.S. goals for the November NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, which is aimed at setting a “transformation” agenda to help the 26-nation alliance better undertake its new global missions.

(...)

“I think the attention of the international community could be higher than it is at the moment,” de Hoop Scheffer said. “A high level of political attention is absolutely essential.”

(...)

“Increasingly, we’re finding that security training is a ticket to nations being able to take care of more of their own problems rather than needing heavy NATO deployments,” she said. “And it’s also the exit strategy for parts of the world where we’re already deployed.”

NATO will soon start contributing to the training of the Afghan National Army. And the Darfur mission – though it included an airlift element – is “fundamentally ... a training effort,” Nuland said.

[http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006\\_07/alia/a6072508.htm](http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2006_07/alia/a6072508.htm)

## THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS

### AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

#### **MORE TROOPS: THE CONSENSUS FOR A LARGER ARMY IS ABOUT AS COMPLETE AS IT COULD BE**

**By Frederick W. Kagan, William Kristol. Posted: Monday, September 25, 2006  
Published in *The Weekly Standard*, Publication Date: October 2, 2006**

You can hardly read a story about Iraq these days without seeing an Army or Marine officer say he doesn't have enough troops to accomplish his mission. Senior officers respond that this is what junior commanders always say. That's not quite true. Commanders in charge of secondary missions often ask for more resources than they need, not recognizing their missions are less vital. But the calls for more troops in Iraq come from soldiers training Iraqis, from soldiers trying to secure Baghdad, from soldiers in Anbar. If all of these are secondary missions, where's the main effort? The truth is there are not enough ground forces in Iraq, and military officers are finally saying so in public.

The administration could respond to this obvious fact by sending more troops. Rather than do that, some military and civilian leaders are spinning: There are no more troops to send, they say. In fact, some military leaders say we won't be able to sustain even the current levels--as CENTCOM commander General John Abizaid has said we must--without risking grave damage to the military.



To those who warn that Iraq is "breaking the Army," we would respond that losing in Iraq will increase the burden on the military over the coming decades rather than decreasing it. Nothing breaks a military like losing.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24939,filter.all/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24939,filter.all/pub_detail.asp)

## **IRAN'S NUCLEAR IMPASSE**

**By Michael A. Ledeen**

**Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs), July 20, 2006**

.."I am most grateful for your kind invitation to discuss American policy toward Iran. Sadly, recent events have made this discussion more urgent than ever. But that is what often happens when successive administrations, of both political parties and of various political convictions, avoid dealing with a serious problem. It doesn't go away. Instead, the problem gets worse and the cost of dealing with it becomes more and more burdensome. The theocratic tyranny in Tehran is a very serious problem, and it is becoming graver. It has already cost a great number of American lives, and an even greater number of innocent Iranians, Iraqis, Israelis, Lebanese, Argentineans and others around the world have fallen prey to the mullahs. And now they are hell-bent to become a nuclear power."

[http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24687,filter.all/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24687,filter.all/pub_detail.asp)

## **BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

### **A BROOKINGS SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY STATESMAN'S FORUM ON "IRAQ IN TRANSITION"**

**Featured Speaker: Barham Salih, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq  
September 13, 2006**

Following parliamentary elections in 2005, Iraq formed its first permanent government on May 20, 2006. A key figure in the new administration is Barham Salih, who holds the post of Deputy Prime Minister. Twice elected to parliament as a member of the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, Salih has served in every Iraqi government since June 2004. As the former Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Sulaimani, he worked closely with the United States and oversaw a period of economic growth and reconstruction.

On September 13, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih as part of its Statesman's Forum. Martin Indyk, senior fellow and Saban Center director, provided introductory remarks and moderated the panel discussion.

<http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060913iraq.htm>

Read the full transcript: <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060913iraq.pdf>

Read the event summary: <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060913iraqsummary.pdf>

## **WHAT PRICE FREEDOM? ASSESSING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S FREEDOM AGENDA**

**Tamara Cofman Wittes, Research Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy; Sarah E. Yerkes, Ph.D. Candidate, Georgetown University**  
**Saban Center Analysis, Number 10, September 2006**



(...)U.S. democracy assistance to the Middle East has increased considerably in recent years, but diplomatic efforts to support democratic development have lagged behind. However, the ultimate success of the United States' democracy promotion effort will rest in large part on the degree to which the Administration is able to build effective institutions to advance democracy that will outlast President Bush's term in office. (...)

<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/wittes20060901.htm>

View Full Paper (PDF—501kb):

<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/wittes20060901.pdf>

## **BRIDGING THE TRANSATLANTIC COUNTERTERRORISM GAP**

**Jeremy Shapiro, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe;**  
**Daniel L. Byman, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy**  
**Published in *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2006**

Rhetorically, the United States and Europe are united in their opposition to terrorism. Governments on each side of the Atlantic frequently assert that counterterrorism cooperation is essential to solving the problem, and they join together to condemn outrages such as the July 7, 2005, attacks in London. In terms of doctrine, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 and European Union Security Strategy of 2003 are remarkably similar in their descriptions of the new threats to national security. Both highlight international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ungoverned spaces that might foster terrorism as the central security concerns for the future.

Day-to-day cooperation between the United States and most European countries proceeds apace and is often effective. Although officials on each side have complaints, they are generally satisfied. As the Washington Post reported in 2005, the CIA's multinational counterterrorist intelligence center is located in Paris and has been a critical component of at least 12 operations, including the capture of one of Al Qaeda's most important European operatives.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, during the transatlantic crisis regarding Iraq, the practical necessity of counterterrorism cooperation helped preserve U.S. relations with Germany and France.

<http://www.brook.edu/printme.wbs?page=/pagedefs/c255a3345bb5ff402ae1cce10a1415cb.xml>

Full article: <http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/fellows/shapiro20060901.pdf>

## **THE 9-11 WAR PLUS 5: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD AT U.S.-ISLAMIC WORLD RELATIONS**

**Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies**

**Brookings Institution, U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper #10  
September 2006**



It is hard to imagine that it has been five years since the 9-11 attacks. The scope of developments and actions that followed is breathtaking, from two ground wars and over 20,000 American casualties, to a complete jettison of 60 years of American strategic doctrine aimed at preserving stability in the Middle East.

The distance of time now allows us to step back and weigh the consequences. The echoes of the attacks were felt in everything from the invasion of Iraq and the massive political changes that swept Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, etc. to the Danish cartoon controversy. History, though,

will judge these to be but theaters within a much larger problematique that will shape American grand strategy over the next decades. Five years in, it is now clear that the 9-11 attacks created a new dynamic for global politics, and thus American foreign policy, centering around the changed relationship between a state and a religion. The most dominant superpower in world history and the world's fastest growing religious community of 1.4 billion Muslim believers now stand locked in a dynamic of mutual suspicion, distrust, and anger. It continues to spiral worse. We have entered the era of the 9-11 War, a contestation in the realm of ideas and security that is quintessentially 21st century in its modes and processes. This melding of hot and cold war is not a battle between, but a battle within. Most worrisome, five years in, it is not going well so far for either the U.S. or the Muslim world.

<http://www.brook.edu/printme.wbs?page=/fp/saban/analysis/singer20060901.htm>

Full paper: <http://www.brook.edu/fp/saban/analysis/singer20060901.pdf>

## **GLOBAL NATO**

**Ivo H. Daalder and James Goldgeier, Brookings Institution**

**This article appears in the September/October 2006 publication of *Foreign Affairs***

With little fanfare—and even less notice—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has gone global. Created to protect postwar Western Europe from the Soviet Union, the alliance is now seeking to bring stability to other parts of the world. In the process, it is extending both its geographic reach and the range of its operations. In recent years, it has played peacekeeper in Afghanistan, trained security forces in Iraq, and given logistical support to the African Union's mission in Darfur. It assisted the tsunami relief effort in Indonesia and ferried supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and to those of a massive earthquake in Pakistan.

NATO's expanded ambit is a result of the new global politics that emerged after the Cold War. Today, terrorists born in Riyadh and trained in Kandahar hatch deadly plots in Hamburg to fly

airplanes into buildings in New York. Such interconnection means that developments in one place affect the security, prosperity, and well-being of citizens everywhere. NATO has recognized that the best (and at times the only) defense against such remote dangers is to tackle them at their source. Such forward defense often requires a global military reach: helicopters to deliver supplies to disaster zones and evacuate the injured; command, control, and reconnaissance capabilities to sustain peacekeeping missions; and experienced military officers to train local security forces. As the world's premier multinational military organization, comprising many prosperous nations with a vested interest in maintaining global stability, NATO is uniquely suited to meeting such demands.

At the same time, with U.S. forces stretched thin in Iraq and European states failing to invest enough to participate significantly in operations far away from home, NATO is struggling to fulfill even its current commitments. And while the alliance has increasingly recognized the necessity of operating far from Europe—or "out of area," in NATO parlance—it has been limited by the requirement that its member states be North American or European.

NATO leaders are expected to address this problem at a summit in Riga, Latvia, in November. They will consider a proposal to redefine the alliance's role by deepening relations with countries beyond the transatlantic community, starting with partners such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. A key part of this effort is the proposal by the United States and the United Kingdom to forge a "global partnership" between NATO and non-European states that will provide a forum for expanded dialogue with other major democratic countries.

Although this initiative is a good first step, it does not go far enough. NATO's next move must be to open its membership to any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO's new responsibilities. Only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of the day.

<http://www.brook.edu/printme.wbs?page=/pagedefs/1fba59d45648ff40372238d50a1415cb.xml>

Full article: [http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/daalder/2006sept\\_oct.pdf](http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/daalder/2006sept_oct.pdf)

## **CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

### **HIZBOLLAH'S OUTLOOK IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT**

**By Amal Saad-Ghorayeb**

**CEIP Policy Outlook No. 27, August 2006**



#### **Part One: Motives, Strategy and Objectives**

As the international community scrambles to resolve the current crisis in Lebanon, the motives and objectives of Hizbollah and Israel remain unclear. How did the conflict escalate so quickly? What do both parties hope to gain? With diplomatic efforts to achieve a resolution of the fighting between Israel and Hizbollah in a critical phase, understanding Hizbollah's outlook and intentions is crucial.

In a new Policy Outlook, Hizbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict (Part One): Motives, Strategy, and Objectives, Amal Saad-Ghorayeb provides vital insights. Saad-Ghorayeb, a Lebanese political analyst writing from Beirut, draws on interviews she carried out with Hizbollah officials both before and after the outbreak of fighting in mid-July.

## **Part Two: Accommodating Diplomacy and Preparing for the Post-War Context**

The adoption of UN Resolution 1701 represents to many Lebanese citizens the possibility of a return to normal life, but doubts abound about the possibility of a lasting peace. Israeli forces remain in Lebanon for now but Hizbollah is unwilling to tolerate their presence and has yet shown no signs of willingness to disarm. What is the likelihood Hizbollah will disarm as the peace process unfolds? What is Hizbollah's post-conflict agenda? How will the outcome of this war change Hizbollah, domestically and internationally?

This is a web-only publication

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=print&id=18611>

Part 1, Full Text (PDF): [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/saad\\_ghorayeb\\_final.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/saad_ghorayeb_final.pdf)

Part 2, Full Text (PDF): [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ghorayeb\\_part2\\_final.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ghorayeb_part2_final.pdf)

## **CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

### **JUDGING THE IRANIAN THREAT: 20 QUESTIONS WE NEED TO ANSWER CSIS Report, September 19, 2006**



Iran's actions in the last year have unsettled many around the world, provoking an active and rich debate as to how nations should best respond. Embedded in this debate are widely divergent assumptions, assessments, and conclusions about Iranian intentions and Iranian actions.

To add clarity and intellectual rigor to this debate, CSIS has prepared a list of issues — "20 questions" — intended to highlight these points of divergence. Few people will agree on the answers to all 20 questions. They differ sometimes on the basis of fact, and other times on the basis of judgment. Yet, it is precisely those answers that determine both the threats and opportunities contained in Iran's actions and the world's potential responses.

In the interest of promoting a healthy debate on these issues, CSIS has not only laid out the questions, but it has also prepared two opposing responses for each question to help illustrate the vibrancy of the debate. Although CSIS as an institution has no position on these questions, the wide range of experts at CSIS provides equally wide-ranging analysis.

[http://www.csis.org/component/option,com\\_csis\\_pubs/task,view/id,3482/type,1/](http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3482/type,1/)

Full Report: [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060919\\_20questions.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060919_20questions.pdf)



## **NATO RELUCTANCE TO SEND MORE TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE NO SURPRISE**

**By Julianne Smith, Deputy Director**

**CSIS International Security Program, September 20, 2006**



Last week, NATO's top commander, General James L. Jones asked NATO allies to send an additional 2,500 troops to combat Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan. Other than Poland – which promised to send more troops early next year – Jones' call was met with a deafening silence across Europe. Given Europe's continuing struggle to match its ambitions with capabilities, many countries' resistance to participating in high-intensity combat operations, and growing fatigue with the U.S.-led war on terror, Europe's reaction should not come as a surprise.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, European countries at both the national level and inside international organizations such as NATO and the EU have issued dozens of strategy documents outlining the need for enhanced capabilities to combat terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, deal with failed or failing states, contend with regional conflicts as well as respond to humanitarian crises or other challenges. Transformation from static Cold War militaries into leaner forces has also been a priority for NATO countries. Despite these goals, defense spending in most European countries remains flat or in decline with few signs of increased funding in the next five years.

[http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/060920\\_smith\\_commentary.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/060920_smith_commentary.pdf)

## **FIVE YEARS AFTER 9/11**

**Edited by Julianne Smith and Thomas Sanderson**

**CSIS, ISBN 0-89206-492-7, September 7, 2006**



Few, if any, events in modern history have had the instant, transformative impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In a matter of hours, the outlook of the United States changed profoundly. Gone were old beliefs about the almost unique security the nation enjoyed by virtue of its two ocean barriers to the east and the west and two friendly neighbors to the north and the south. Gone were broad confidences in the safety of critical systems such as commercial aviation. And gone was the assurance that terrorism, an age-old and familiar phenomenon, would be a tactic focused on the few. America's response to the cataclysm was broad based, with massive initiatives undertaken in the belief that the global security landscape, as well as key national institutions, needed reshaping to provide citizens with better security.

The short essays in this volume offer evaluations by CSIS scholars of the progress and the setbacks to date in America's war on terror. They aspire to be both timely and balanced. Five years after the attacks, we have a basis for an initial consideration of how the nation has fared

with the challenges that were set on that fateful day. It is the authors' hope that the judgments presented here cast a light on this period that is both helpful and fair.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/five\\_years\\_after\\_9-11smallsize.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/five_years_after_9-11smallsize.pdf)

## **WINNING THE WAR ON TERRORISM: The Need for a Fundamentally Different Strategy**

**Anthony H. Cordesman**

**CSIS, September 25, 2006**



The latest events in Somalia are yet another warning that the United States, its Western allies and Islamic nations need to change their strategies to win the “war on terrorism.” The basic lessons have been the same in Iraq, Afghanistan and throughout the Islamic world. The present mix of Western action and Islamic inaction cannot possibly win.

Part of the problem is conceptual. The United States and most Western nations may be “politically correct” when they call the current struggle a “long war” or “global war on terrorism,” but the reality is very different. Most terrorism is a minor and largely national threat.

The real threat is Islamic extremism, specifically neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremism. The violent transnational movements that support these beliefs, symbolized by al-Qaeda, are the only serious global threat that uses terrorism. Isolated terrorist movements do need to be defeated, but Irish, Spanish, secular Palestinian, Sri Lankan, Japanese and other such groups are peripheral threats at most.

Recognizing this fact, and focusing on it, is critical to any hope of winning the real “war on terrorism.” The struggle is religious and ideological, not military or driven by secular values. It is a struggle for the future of Islam, and it is not generic, global or focused on political or economic systems.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060925\\_winning\\_the\\_war.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060925_winning_the_war.pdf)

## **MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ**

**Anthony H. Cordesman**

**CSIS Report, September 5, 2006**



The August 2006 quarterly report to Congress on “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq” was carefully released Friday, just before a Labor Day weekend. This may have been to minimize reporting on the extent to which it reflects a major increase in the risk of a civil war.

While the new report is more frank about this risk -- and many other aspects of the situation in Iraq -- it still has many major flaws and



omissions, and there are some areas where the reporting seems to deliberately disguise major problems and risks.

This report acts as a user guide to the report's strengths and weaknesses, key issues that merit media and analytic attention, and key areas where improvements are still needed in the quality and integrity of Department of Defense reporting.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060905\\_iraq\\_quarterly.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060905_iraq_quarterly.pdf)

## **COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS**

### **AMERICAN MUSLIMS AND THE THREAT OF HOMEGROWN TERRORISM**

**Eben Kaplan, Assistant Editor**

**Council on Foreign Relations, September 22, 2006**

Experts say it is quite likely the next terrorist attack in the United States will not be the work of well-trained al-Qaeda operatives sent from abroad, but rather that of an American citizen. As al-Qaeda leaders focus more of their energy on trying to inspire others to commit acts of terror, most security and counterterrorism officials believe their message will resonate with at least some small number of Americans. Such fears tend to focus on American Muslims, and experts say this is logical given recent events in Europe. Yet the American Islamic community also has proven one of the government's best resources for preventing the emergence of homegrown Islamic terrorists.

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/11509/american\\_muslims\\_and\\_the\\_threat\\_of\\_homegrown\\_terrorism.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11509/american_muslims_and_the_threat_of_homegrown_terrorism.html)

### **PRIORITIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY**

**Steven Simon, CFR, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies**


**Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
September 12, 2006**

The author concentrates on three issues: first, the importance of cities as terrorist havens and terrorist targets; second, the continuing significance to many jihadists of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and third, the need to preserve the good will and sense of belonging of America's Muslim communities as a matter of national security, beyond the intrinsic virtues of a cohesive, considerate society in which citizens of all creeds can feel at home.

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/11424/priorities\\_for\\_homeland\\_security.html?breadcrumb=default](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11424/priorities_for_homeland_security.html?breadcrumb=default)

## **FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY: GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT**

**Alan P. Larson, David M. Marchick. Council Special Report No. 18  
Council on Foreign Relations Press, July 2006**



In this Council Special Report, Alan P. Larson and David M. Marchick discuss the benefits of foreign direct investment in the United States and the security risks posed by foreign ownership of certain U.S. assets. They examine the inner workings of the committee that conducts security reviews—the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)—and recommend what policymakers should and should not consider in reforming it. The authors acknowledge that a lack of transparency in the process mixed with a new security environment, in which foreign ownership is seen as more sensitive, has cast doubt over the nature and effectiveness of the process, and they offer suggestions on how best to address congressional concerns. At the same time, they argue that CFIUS has been more effective than is commonly assumed and warn against alleged cures that promise to be far worse than any “disease” that currently exists.

<http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CFIUSreport.pdf>

## **HERITAGE FOUNDATION**

### **CONGRESS JEOPARDIZES ITS OWN POWERS BY BALKING ON TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM COMPROMISE**

**by Todd Gaziano and Garrett Murch**

**Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1218, September 18, 2006**



Last week, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted out of committee legislation to provide oversight of the National Security Agency’s Terrorist Surveillance Program. The bill acknowledges that the President has some inherent constitutional authority to engage in national security intercepts—a concession necessary to gain the President’s signature—but also includes reforms that increase congressional and judicial oversight of the intercepts. The House Judiciary Committee, however, cancelled last week’s scheduled markup of analogous legislation due, in part, to the committee’s inability to agree that the President has any inherent constitutional authority to intercept enemy communications during wartime. Not only is this doubt

legally unpersuasive—nearly all court decisions have held otherwise—but it is also risky for Congress. A legislative compromise similar to the Senate bill is the only way that Congress can give the President support to continue a program that is called for in this war while preserving the constitutional claims of each branch for another day.

[http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/upload/wm\\_1218.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/upload/wm_1218.pdf)

## **INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)**

### **MOLDOVA'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE**

**Europe Report N°175**

**ICG, 17 August 2006**

With Romania's expected entry into the European Union in 2007, the EU will share a border with Moldova, a weak state divided by conflict and plagued by corruption and organised crime. Moldova's leadership has declared its desire to join the EU, but its commitment to European values is suspect, and efforts to resolve its dispute with the breakaway region of Transdniestria have failed to end a damaging stalemate that has persisted for fifteen years. Young people have little confidence in the country's future and are leaving at an alarming rate. If Moldova is to become a stable part of the EU's neighbourhood, there will need to be much greater international engagement, not only in conflict resolution but in spurring domestic reforms to help make the country more attractive to its citizens.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4340&l=1>

## **NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)**

### **REFORMING PENTAGON STRATEGIC DECISIONMAKING**

**By Christopher J. Lamb and Irving Lachow**

***Strategic Forum* No. 221, July 2006**

**National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies**



Decisionmaking in the Pentagon is intrinsically difficult, but the growing consensus is that reform is both necessary and possible. The chorus of voices calling for reform reached a crescendo with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which gives unprecedented priority to this objective. Yet the Pentagon's large and powerful bureaucracy and complex operating environment pose daunting obstacles for even the most knowledgeable, experienced, and determined leaders. Decision support processes designed to be rational are anything but that, and attempts by Pentagon leaders to compensate for this situation often make the problem worse. Furthermore, intuitive decisionmaking support that could improve

strategic decisionmaking is ignored on the erroneous presumption that it is illegitimate.

Reforming Pentagon decisionmaking requires focusing the process on the Secretary's strategic agenda; improving rational decision support provided by the contingency planning and resource allocation systems; and refining senior leader intuitive decisionmaking capability with exercises and simulations. These reforms cannot be implemented by fiat. The Pentagon needs a new organizational construct that would be an "honest broker" for improving decisionmaking support. It would be empowered to provide standards and products for both rational and nonrational decision support and would use collaborative teams that draw upon expertise from across the Pentagon's functional and regional organizations.

Implementing such reform would be difficult, but no more so than the training revolutions that the Services instituted in the 1970s to improve decisionmaking in conflict. The same leap forward at the strategic level is possible, and those who go in harm's way deserve nothing less.  
<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF221/SF221.pdf>

## **PEW**

### **AMERICAN ATTITUDES HOLD STEADY IN FACE OF FOREIGN CRISES: STRONG SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL - NO SURGE IN TERROR CONCERNS OR BOOST FOR BUSH Pew Report, Released: August 17, 2006**



The public is paying a great deal of attention to major overseas events - the reported terrorist plot against U.S. trans-Atlantic jet liners, the war in Lebanon, as well as the ongoing violence in Iraq. However, there is little indication that these dramatic stories have materially changed public attitudes. Worries about another terrorist attack have not surged. The public continues to express high levels of support for Israel, even as a sizable minority views Israel as mostly responsible for the civilian casualties arising from the fighting. And while more Americans say the U.S. is losing ground in preventing a civil war in Iraq, basic attitudes about the conflict are largely unchanged.

<http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=285>

Full Report: <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/285.pdf>

## **RAND**

### **RADICALIZATION: HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATION**

**John D. Woodward, Jr., RAND Institute**

**Testimony presented to the House Homeland Security Committee,  
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk  
Assessment on September 20, 2006.**

U.S. Government use of biometric technologies is a success story, as measured by threats identified, intelligence gained, and lives saved. Hopefully, I have provided the Subcommittee with suggestions you may find worth pursuing. I believe we are still in the very early stages of using biometric technologies for homeland security, with much more to do. As experience shows, the U.S. Government can use this significant tool for protecting the nation while preserving civil liberties.


[http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND\\_CT267.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT267.pdf)



**AIR POWER IN THE NEW COUNTERINSURGENCY ERA: THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF USAF ADVISORY AND ASSISTANCE MISSIONS**

**Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, Karl P. Mueller**

**RAND Monograph, September 15, 2006**



Often treated by Americans as an exceptional form of warfare, insurgency is anything but. Spanning the globe, centuries, and societies, insurgency is quite common. Given the threat insurgency presents to U.S. interests and allies around the world, the importance of counterinsurgency is no surprise.

However, history has shown that insurgencies are rarely defeated by outside powers. Rather, the best role for outsiders is an indirect one: training, advising, and equipping the local nation, which must win the war politically and militarily. And while counterinsurgency might seem to be a task most suited to ground forces, air power has much to contribute. These facts combine to suggest that advising, training, and equipping partner air forces

will be a key component of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts worldwide. The authors note that, if the Air Force is to participate in these tasks, it will need to make counterinsurgency an institutional priority, developing the capabilities of its personnel both as advisors and trainers and as combatants, as well as developing the necessary institutional support structures.

Full document: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND\\_MG509.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.pdf)

Summary only: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND\\_MG509.sum.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.sum.pdf)

**NEW COMBAT AND NONCOMBAT ROLES FOR U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS**

**John Gordon, IV, Peter A. Wilson, John Birkler, Steven Boraz, Gordon T. Lee**

**RAND Research Brief, September 8, 2006**

This research brief describes the range of new capabilities that U.S. aircraft carriers will require for combat and noncombat operations in the next 20 to 30 years.

To meet future combat and noncombat demands, U.S. aircraft carriers will require a range of new capabilities. Carriers will need to be better able to mix and match personnel, aircraft, and other assets to emerging tasks. They will need capabilities to perform more extensive surveillance and reconnaissance, conduct longer-range air operations, and operate in nuclear environments. And they will need to be more modular, deploy on shorter notice, and be prepared to handle more casualties than they can today.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_briefs/RB9185/index1.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9185/index1.html)

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_briefs/2006/RAND\\_RB9185.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB9185.pdf)

**EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT REQUIRES SOPHISTICATED INTELLIGENCE, RAPID RESPONSE, AND LONG-RANGE CAPABILITIES**

**David A. Shlapak**

**RAND Research Brief, September 7, 2006**

Examines how U.S. national security strategy and the USAF might change to better confront new challenges presented by future major regional conflicts and counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and nation-assistance operations. The report proposes a new “division of labor” among the services to better adapt them to the varied demands that they will face in the future and identifies important new priorities for the USAF, including: helping defeat adversary ballistic and cruise missiles; helping build and operate the joint and interagency “inform and act” intelligence infrastructure that will be needed to deal with the difficult security challenges confronting the nation; and rebalancing the force to better enable prompt operations from bases far away from the battlefield. New or accelerated initiatives are needed to identify, track, and engage small, mobile, or concealed targets; defeat advanced air defenses; neutralize adversary nuclear weapons; and provide assistance to friendly governments threatened by insurgencies or terrorist groups.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical\\_reports/TR322/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR322/)


[http://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_briefs/2006/RAND\\_RB197.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB197.pdf)

**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM**

**Edited by Dr. Williamson Murray**

**SSI, September 2006**



In March 2006, President George W. Bush signed a new National Security Strategy that he refers to as a “wartime national security strategy” and states that to follow the path the United States has chosen, we must “maintain and expand our national strength.” One way to do this is to study and propose solutions to the complex challenges the United States faces in the 21st century. At the U.S. Army War College, the students have embraced this challenge and spend a year developing their intellectual strength in areas that extend well beyond the familiar operational and tactical realm to which they are accustomed. This collection of essays written by students enrolled in the U.S. Army War

College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) reflects the development of their strategic thought applied to a wide range of contemporary issues based in theory, doctrine, strategy and history.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB710.pdf>



## **THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS**

**Edited by Colonel (USA, Ret) Joseph R. Cerami, Lieutenant General (USA, Ret) Richard A. Chilcoat, Patrick B Baetjer**  
**SSI Colloquium Report, 122 p., August 2006**



What changes, if any, are there in U.S. and European defense and foreign policy in the aftermath of the War in Iraq, particularly in light of a new consensus for coordinating U.S. and European military strategy, planning and operational activities. This conference report examines key dimensions of this relationship, which has major implications for global as well as regional security.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB725.pdf>

## **UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE**

### **UNDERSTANDING THE IRAN-HEZBOLLAH CONNECTION**

**By Robert Grace and Andrew Mandelbaum**  
**USIPeace Briefing, September 2006**

To evaluate Iran's role in the most recent Israel-Hezbollah fighting and in the dynamic political scene left in its wake, the Institute's Muslim World Initiative convened a panel featuring several distinguished Iran experts. Vali Nasr, adjunct senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, addressed the effects of the war on sectarian political dynamics in the region; Hadi Semati, public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, elucidated the internal political scene in Iran; Kenneth Pollack, director of research and senior fellow at The Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, discussed the U.S. policy stance toward the region; and Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, commented on his colleagues' presentations and offered his outlook on the prospects for the region. Moderating the event was Daniel Brumberg, special advisor to the Institute's Muslim World Initiative and author of *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran* (2001).

[http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace\\_briefings/2006/0922\\_iran\\_hezbollah.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0922_iran_hezbollah.html)

### **THE RISE OF ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN BANGLADESH**

**Sumit Ganguly**  
**USIP Special Report No. 171, August 2006**

Bangladesh has generally been heralded as a stable, democratic Muslim state that has made great strides in economic and human development. Following the restoration of democracy in 1990, it carried out three largely free and fair general elections in 1991, 1996, and 2001.





Since 1999, attacks by Islamist militants have been increasing. They have targeted opposition politicians, scholars, journalists, members of the judiciary, religious minorities, and members of the Islamic Ahmadiyya sect.

Recent years have seen a deepening crisis in governance with continued politicization of civil society, deterioration of judicial independence, and diminishing rule of law and respect for human rights.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr171.html>

Full report: <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr171.pdf>

## ARTICLES FROM U.S. JOURNALS

(Contact the IRC for copies)

### **HIGH-TECH TERRORISM: AL-QAEDA'S USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY**

**Brachman, Jarret M.**

*Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 149-164 (AA06329)

The author, a counterterrorism research director at the United States Military Academy, introduces readers to the many ways that al-Qaeda is leveraging new technologies to spread its virulent ideology and transform itself into an "organic social movement." By "weaponizing the internet," terrorists are more effectively sharing information, distributing propaganda, and training for future attacks. Web sites, animation and video clips, discussion boards, even video games are used to reinforce the terrorists' message among members and attract new recruits. While these sites also offer counterterrorism experts an opportunity to study the terrorists, they also encourage like-minded individuals to produce spin-off propaganda materials and provide valuable information to "homegrown" terrorist groups planning attacks of their own. Unless the U.S. can develop a strategy to effectively counter radicalization of the next generation of Muslim youth, Brachman it will face a long struggle against terrorism.

### **SENSE AND SYMBOLISM: EUROPE TAKES ON HUMAN SECURITY**

**Liotta, P. H.; Owen, Taylor**

*Parameters*, Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 85-102 (AA06330)

Liotta, executive director of the Pell Center (Newport, R.I.) for International Relations and Public Policy, and Taylor, a doctoral candidate at Oxford University, discuss the emergence of the concept of "human security" as contrasted with the more traditional concept of "national security," presenting their case through an analysis of recent policy statements by the European Union (A Secure Europe in a Better World) and the U.S. (National Security Strategy of the United States of America). While acknowledging that the term is not used in either of the documents, they state, "... the concept's principles, including the need to address and solve

longer-term development issues ... are omnipresent." They also point to "a grand experiment in security architecture" involving the expansion and changing role of NATO, the Partnership for Peace, and the OSCE. "Europe has at least acknowledged the need to think, act, and organize differently to prepare for the future. Specifically, the EU security strategy stresses the necessity of 'effective multilateralism' and often acknowledges the crucial leadership roles of the United States in making this multilateralism both coherent and effective." Many questions remain concerning the security challenges of the future, "but at least the dialogue has begun."

### **AGENCIES SEEK SEAMLESS NETWORK**

**Magnuson, Stew**

***National Defense*, vol. 90, no. 626, January 2006, pp. 42-43 (AA06331)**

Just before 9/11, the Departments of Justice and Treasury signed a memorandum of understanding to create a joint communications system. The impetus for this agreement was replacement of the existing patchwork of federal, state and local communication systems with an integrated wireless network (IWN). The IWN is designed to both reduce costs and make communication more effective during major disasters. The Department of Homeland Security has since joined Justice and Treasury and IWN's long-term goal is to connect 80,000 officers from the three departments throughout the United States. This article is currently available on the Internet at: <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/Jan/SB-Agencies.htm>

### **NATIONALISM AND POLICYMAKING IN THE BALKANS**

**Miller, Nicholas J.**

***Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2006, pp. 15-19 (AA06332)**

With the March 2006 death of Slobodan Milosevic and the launch of the Kosovo status negotiations, attention has once again been drawn to the Balkan nationalism of the 1990s. Asks the author, "were the tragedies of the Balkan conflict the malevolent work of evil politicians or a logical and continuous - perhaps even inevitable - product of culture? Was Balkan nationalism ancient and organic or modern and manipulated?" The importance of this distinction for policymakers is that the "ancient" view argues against intervention in such circumstances while the "modern" view supports intervention. Nicholas J. Miller, graduate director of the Department of History at Boise State University, where he teaches courses on Central and Eastern European history, argues that it is important to see elements of both the ancient and the modern and to adjust policy accordingly. He suggests less emphasis on "demonstrations of our power and their weakness, such as the current demand for the handover of Hague indictees before progress can be made on assistance to Serbia" and more attention to "rebuilding stable economies, even in the absence of sincere political reform. ... Western policymakers need to be prepared to reject easy answers: good policy requires an understanding of the historical, political, and economic conditions on the ground."

## **A DANGEROUS SEPARATION: THE SCHISM BETWEEN AMERICAN SOCIETY AND ITS MILITARY**

**Wrona, Richard M.**

***World Affairs*, vol. 169, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 25-38 (AA06333)**

The author, an Army officer and instructor at the United States Military Academy, advocates universal military conscription as a means to mitigate the widening culture gap between the U.S. military and American society. Wrona provides an historical overview of American attitudes toward the military as well as polling data suggesting that military personnel see themselves as increasingly isolated, conservative, and moving away from their traditional apolitical role in society. These factors, combined with the increasing use of private military firms and the tendency for elected officials to use the military as backdrops for photo-ops. The best way to manage the civil-military gap, the author argues, is to narrow it by instituting a system of universal service, which would expose a wider segment of American society to military culture, and shift attitudes away from "rights" in favor of the "responsibilities" that underpin democratic societies.

## **FROM CAPTIVE TO FAILED STATE: ARGENTINA UNDER SYSTEMIC POPULISM, 1975-2006**

**Escude, Carlos**

***Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 125-148 (AA06349)**

Thanks to a virtually unbroken cycle of "systemic populism," Argentineans below the poverty line has ballooned in the past 50 years from 10 percent in 1945 to 45 percent in 2005. This practice of modest handouts to the poor for electoral purposes while authorizing massive transfers of wealth to "client" business sectors has serious security consequences, putting a "captive state" on the road to becoming a "failing state." Populism remains deeply entrenched in contemporary Argentinean society, with favored industries continuing to benefit, and growing protests of the unemployed are leading to violence. Meanwhile, with the government renationalizing industries to make up lost revenue, and increasing financial speculation, Argentina's regression is unlikely to turn around in the near future.

## **LESSONS OF THE KOREAN WAR FOR THE "SIX-PARTY TALKS"**

**Holmes, James R.**

***World Affairs*, vol. 169, no. 1, Summer 2006, pp.3-24 (AA06350)**

Through a detailed case study of the negotiating process that ended the Korean War, the author illustrates what he considers key lessons to resolve today's nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula. In both cases, North Korea, China, and the United States came to the table with vital interests at stake, but unlike in 1953, none of the negotiating parties today will be able to improve their bargaining position and undercut others -- the U.S. is averse to using military force, and North Korea has hardened its facilities and its regime remains firmly in control.

Another key difference is that while China's support helped to sustain Pyongyang in the 1950s, particularly after Stalin's death, which helped during the Korean War negotiations, its influence on Kim Jong-Il today has been greatly exaggerated. Until North Korea's disastrous socioeconomic conditions threaten its regime, Holmes concludes, "The United States and its partners have few obvious options other than to keep North Korea hemmed in, encourage China to use such influence as it possesses, and pursue patient negotiations."

### **AL QAEDA'S PANDEMIC**

**Kitfield, James**

***National Journal*, Vol. 38, No. 35, September 2, 2006, pp. 20-27 (AA06351)**

The author, a defense and foreign affairs correspondent for National Journal, declares, "In the collective body that is Islamic extremism, often only a few synapses stand between a spoken word and an act of wanton bloodshed halfway around the world. Tracking exactly how the organism of global jihad translates such violent impulses into distant actions is critical to grasping how the virulent terrorism that struck the United States on September 11, 2001, has mutated in the past five years. And that knowledge is key to understanding the degree to which the virus is still spreading." He then goes on to describe various aspects of the planning and execution of recent terrorist attacks, especially the March 2004 train bombing in Madrid. He also discusses "how central the Iraq war has become to the schemes of the Islamic jihad movement" and the use of the war as "an organizing magnet." In his conclusion, he explains, "broad counterinsurgencies are almost never won on the battlefield. Victory will have to come in the political arena."

### **EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE: ENABLER OF INSURGENT SUCCESS**

**Record, Jeffrey**

***Parameters*, Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 36-49 (AA06352)**

The author, a professor of strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, says, "Victorious insurgencies are exceptional because the strong usually beat the weak. But all power is relative, and if an insurgency has access to external assistance, such assistance can alter the insurgent-government power ratio even to the point where the insurgency becomes the stronger side." For example, French assistance to the colonists helped the Americans win the Revolution, whereas the lack of sufficient external assistance led to the defeat of the Confederacy in the Civil War. He cites experts who argue that other elements can explain insurgent success -- such as political will, willingness to sacrifice, and superior strategy -- but contends, "even the most committed and cunning insurgency cannot hope to win without material resources." The author uses analyses of other conflicts, including the Chinese Communists' defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and the French defeats in Indochina and Algeria to support his contention that "External assistance can favorably, even decisively, alter the material power ratio between an insurgency and an enemy government or foreign occupier."

## **DECLARING VICTORY**

**Fallows, James**

***Atlantic Monthly*, September 2006 (AA06312)**

Summary: Based on interviews with over 60 terrorism experts, the author concludes that while al-Qaeda is only a shadow of its pre-9/11 self, the terrorists can continue to harm the United States by goading it into actions that can harm its international standing, such as its continued presence in Iraq, its imprisonment of terrorists in Guantanamo, and ongoing domestic concerns about civil liberties. Because of al-Qaeda's own mistakes, and because of the things the United States and its allies have done right, al-Qaeda's ability to inflict direct damage in America or on Americans has been sharply reduced, leading the author to propose that the United States de-escalate its Global War on Terror by declaring victory and continuing counterterrorism efforts through a more low-key approach of alliance-building and targeted usage of its "hard" and "soft" power.

## **COMMON VALUES: A NEW AGENDA FOR U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS**

**Green, Michael; Szechenyi, Nicholas**

***Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer/Fall 2006, pp. 47-55 (AA06313)**

Summary: Michael Green, senior advisor and Japan chair at CSIS and associate professor of international relations at Georgetown, and Nicholas Szechenyi, fellow and assistant director of the Japan chair at CSIS, write, "The U.S.-Japan alliance has undergone a quiet transformation in recent years, moving beyond ad hoc 'alliance management' to establish a solid foundation for cooperation based on shared values and strategic interests." They describe uncertainties about China's growing economic and military power, concerns about North Korea's nuclear ambitions, Japan's changing role in the international community (including the need to "manage the historical legacies that drag down its leadership potential in Asia"), and the lack of progress in WTO negotiations as factors affecting the future and highlighting the importance of the alliance. "The United States and Japan are positioned to guide the international community toward democracy and prosperity, and common values are the key to getting there."

## **THE CAUSE OF STRIFE IN THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE**

**Kang, David C.**

***Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 23-31 (AA06314)**

Summary: The past decade has seen a marked shift in East Asia's security conditions, yet the relationship between the United States and South Korea have not kept pace. While South Korea is fixated upon efforts to integrate its northern neighbor and develop a unified foreign policy, the United States views all developments in the region through its preoccupation with counterterrorism, proliferation, and homeland security. The author notes that "the day when the United States comprised 90 percent of South Korea's foreign policy focus are gone forever;

South Korea -- and eventually a unified Korea -- will need to decide how it will redefine its relations with the United States as well as juggle competing interests with Japan and China."

**FIGHTING FOR STATEHOOD: THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN-BASED RESISTANCE IN THE EAST TIMORESE, PALESTINIAN, AND KOSOVO ALBANIAN SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS**

**Stephan, Maria**

*Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 57-79 (AA06315)

Summary: In this case study of three successful mass movements, the author argues that civilian-based, non-violent resistance can win asymmetrical conflicts and raise the political, economic, and military costs of maintaining control over occupied territories more effectively than armed struggle. In East Timor, proactive nonviolence forced Indonesia to allow a referendum on independence. In the Palestinian territories, the author argues that the first Intifada was less violent and more effective at bringing Israel to the table than subsequent incarnations. In Kosovo, a nonviolent movement provided nearly a decade of cover that allowed its citizens to build political, economic, and social institutions that could facilitate progress toward final status negotiations. All three cases show that unity, disciplined commitment to nonviolence, and strategic planning are key to successful mass movements.

**REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN KYRGYZSTAN**

**Wood, Tom**

*Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol. 30 no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 43-56 (AA06316)

Summary: The March 2005 movement that ousted Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan's first post-Soviet leader, was not a revolution, as seen previously in Ukraine and Georgia, as much as it was a reorganization. What is truly revolutionary to the author, however, was the country's marked progress over the decade preceding Akayev's ouster, when it saw significant growth in the strength of interest groups, new parties, and healthy political competition across the Kyrgyz domestic scene. Much of this progress can be attributed to clan and tribal interests in Kyrgyz society, which established regularized networks for negotiations and political compromise. In a region marked by a spectrum of authoritarian regimes, the author declares that today's Kyrgyzstan is "perched on a fence between weak autocracy and a near-democracy."

**THE "SOFT WAR" FOR EUROPE'S EAST**

**Jackson, Bruce P.**

*Policy Review*, no. 137, June/July 2006, pp. 3-14 (AA06292)

Summary: The future of Eurasian security is resting on a "soft power" competition among the United States, Europe, and Russia for the future of the Black Sea region. The author calls upon policymakers to dispense with the delusion that Putin's Russia can be a constructive security partner in the area, given its efforts to sustain "frozen conflicts" in Moldova and Georgia, its



blatant meddling in Ukrainian politics, and its willingness to use its energy largesse to exert pressure on its neighbors. He stresses that this does not constitute a return to the Cold War, nor does it mean an end to partnership on other security issues like terrorism and proliferation, but it means confrontation nonetheless. Instead, the West must strongly advocate for an energy strategy that breaks Russia's transit monopoly in the region, provides support and incentives for democratization, especially for Ukraine and Georgia, provides an "open door" to European institutions for states who succeed in democratic reforms, and allows Western institutions and investment into the region.

**THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY REFRAMED: THE IMPACT OF MODERNITY**  
**Gat, Azar**

***World Politics*, vol. 58, no. 1, October 2005, pp. 73-100 (AA06291)**

Summary: Recent years have seen increased academic interest in the Kantian notion that democratic governments are peaceful by nature. Gat, a professor of International Security at Tel Aviv University, contends that even pre-industrial democracies can be belligerent, making modernization a key determinant for a democratic government's political behavior. Not only did the "industrial-technological revolution" make democracy over a large territory possible, it also led to other factors that discourage wars in liberal democracies, including an improved standard of living, the rise of the service economy, and an overall decrease in the number of young males in the population.

**THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION: A MODEL OF ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY**  
**Aslan, Reza**

***New Perspectives Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 24-25 (AA06290)**

Summary: Iraqi leaders have created a constitution that reflects the values of an overwhelming majority of the country's population. This is a remarkable achievement in a fractured country that has never known democracy. The constitution does not guarantee democracy, but this document will give Iraq a good start at becoming a stable Islamic democracy. The path toward democracy can be grueling, and Iraqis have only just started down this long road. Currently available online at [http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2006\\_winter/aslan.html](http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2006_winter/aslan.html)

**EXERCISING WARTIME POWERS: THE NEED FOR A STRONG EXECUTIVE**  
**Yoo, John**

***Harvard International Review*, vol. 28, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 14-17 (AA06274)**

Summary: The author, a law professor at the University of California, Berkley, and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Department of Justice from 2001-2003, argues that the Constitution clearly gives the executive branch the authority to initiate military actions without first seeking the legislative branch's authorization. "Declaring" a war is markedly different than initiating, conducting, or waging one, says the author. Based upon close analysis of the



Constitution, British law, and the usage of language in the 18th Century, the author finds this to be a crucial difference that was purposely written into the Constitution by the Founding Fathers. As the United States confronts an increasingly complex international security environment, the author calls upon readers to reject contentions of Congressional prerogative in favor of the Constitution's intent: a presidency structured to act independently to repel threats with a flexible and supportive political process allowing legislators to subsequently control war through their appropriations authority.

### **TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND U.S. GRAND STRATEGY**

**Nye, Joseph S.**

***Foreign Affairs* vol. 85, no. 4, July/August 2006, pp. 123-148 (AA06273)**

Summary: Through changes he made to U.S. grand strategy after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, George W. Bush hopes to be remembered as a "transformational president," leaving a lasting mark on U.S. foreign policy. Nye points out that while senior administration officials believe "Bush's aggressive democratization will prove successful," evidence offered by history is less optimistic. Since the beginning of the 19th century, the only durable shifts in grand strategy were those of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. A president hoping for transformational policy to succeed usually requires a crisis and particular leadership skills, some of which Bush lack. Bush's legacy depends largely on the outcome in the war in Iraq; as of now, the jury is still out.

### **TO A BAGHDAD VICTORY VIA SAIGON: HOW THE WRONG NATION-BUILDING STRATEGY THAT FAILED IN VIETNAM CAN BE RIGHTED TO SUCCEED IN IRAQ**

**Lomperis, Timothy J.**

***World Affairs*, vol. 168, no. 4, Spring 2006, pp. 147-156 (AA06272)**

Summary: Among the numerous observers quick to draw parallels between conflicts in Iraq and Vietnam, Lomperis draws a unique conclusion. Insurgencies are ultimately struggles for political legitimacy among the population, he argues, and the United States must avoid the mistake it made in Vietnam by forcibly excluding the Communists from civilian politics, which contributed to its legitimacy in the eyes of the Vietnamese. For a truly capable government to emerge in Iraq, the United States must resist the temptation to politically shut out Sunni parties expressing extremist views, and instead must "embrace the difficult but courageous strategy of inclusion -- the path not taken in Saigon -- to victory in Baghdad."

### **REGIME CYCLES: DEMOCRACY, AUTOCRACY, AND REVOLUTION IN POST-SOVIET EURASIA**

**Hale, Henry**

***World Politics*, vol. 58 no. 1, October 2005, pp. 73-100 (AA06270)**

Summary: Regime change does not make democratization a foregone conclusion, concludes Hale in this study of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. A study of

these states' respective political development in the 1990s suggests that regimes can change cyclically, progressively, regressively, or even randomly, depending extent of each country's implementation of "patronal presidentialism," the extensive network of family and clan politics that underlie most systems in former Soviet states. The more ingrown these networks become, the less likelihood of further "color revolutions."

### **AMERICA'S NEW STRATEGIC PARTNER?**

**Carter, Ashton B.**


***Foreign Affairs* vol. 85, no. 4, July/August 2006, pp. 33-44 (AA06268)**

Summary: The U.S.-India deal, in which the U.S. acknowledges India as a legitimate nuclear power, has inspired much debate focused on nuclear issues. Opponents claim that Bush's concessions to India could seriously injure the integrity of the international nonproliferation regime. Ashton Carter, a Harvard professor, admits that while the deal is not balanced, damage done to nonproliferation is limited and overstated. The U.S. government insists the deal is a broader strategic agreement, not an arms treaty. Washington gave way on the nuclear front in order to "gain much more on other fronts," in particular, gains in security down the road in dealing with Iran, Pakistan, and potentially China. Many of the benefits, however, are contingent on India's future, with "no guarantees," as India will have its "own opinions about how best to live up to the deal -- or not."

### **ELECTRONIC JOURNAL:**

**REBUILDING AND RESILIENCE: Five Years After 9/11**


**U.S. Department of State, August 2006**



This journal examines how the United States has rebounded and how the international community has rebuilt and come together to condemn terrorism in the five years since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Highlights include articles about the rebuilding of the area around the World Trade Center, U.S. government efforts to facilitate travel to the United States, an interfaith roundtable, planned 9/11 memorials, and how survivors are rebuilding their lives.

<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0806/ijpe/ijpe0806.htm>

**ELECTRONIC JOURNAL:  
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY  
U.S. Department of State, September 2006**



Introduced by Secretary Rice, this electronic journal features essays by each regional bureau Assistant Secretary outlining U.S. policy in that region. Each essay also explains the Assistant Secretary's personal vision for that region, and outlines how the Secretary's "transformational diplomacy" will help our international partners build and sustain democratic, well-governed states.

<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0906/ijpe/ijpe0906.htm>

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